Dave, Bhavna. (2007) Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power. New York: Routledge.
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MAJOR THEMES:
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--Depoliticization of ethnicity that we created
\n--Hybridity of Soviet identity
\n--The USSR was not colonial (though you can be excused for thinking that it was)
\n--The new boss is same as the old boss
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Debate: is the FSU post-colonial or isn't it?
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Cognitive frames—how people view the world, esp. institutions and practices, and which outlive \"regime change.\"
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State formation != regime change; Kazakhstan et al have consolidated the Soviet regimes while forming a state!
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Assumptions:
\n--everybody worked together to create the Soviet state
\n--the USSR is the 900-pound gorilla of history (it still affects everything)
\n–Existing social material got remixed; new culture/politics did not spring forth from anyone's forehead.
\n--pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet are different things and each contained hybridities.
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*Suggests that when Kazakhs talk shit about communism, they're just internalizing/appealing (\"colluding\") to Westernized assumptions about how evil the USSR was; in reality they've internalized the idea that Communisim was a \"civilizing\" force.
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Martin, Terry. (2001) The Affirmative-Action Empire: Nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union 1923-1939. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.
\nSlezkine, Yuri. (1994) The USSR as a communal apartment, or how a socialist state promoted ethnic particularism. Slavic Review, 52(2), pp. 414-52
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Bolsheviks wanted an un-empire, keeping to Russia's imperial borders but promising moderinity and self-determination; they used imperial tactics with a non-imperial goal. (Cf. Michael Smith 1999?)
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By identifying ethnic groups and labeling some of them as \"backwards\" or \"oppressed,\" Bolsheviks reiterated a system where \"Russian\" is not an ethnic group; aka trying to help simultaneously made things worse.
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Some ethnic groups co-opted the language of ethnic identity to their benefit, but it was still underlyingly imperial: modernizing = civilizing nad we are all together.
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Key differences between colonization and plain ol' state building (aka this was not just the Russian state expanding into geographically contiguous territory):
\n--violence: there was some.
\n–Persistant \"othering\" of non-Russians; though Dave argues this wasn't old-fashioned racism, but a desire to avoid Russification so desperate that it raced right into the other direction.
\n--State-building is pretty homogenous because internal divisions are more fluid; the fact of ethnic divisions made Soviet enterprises more piecemeal.
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Thus KZ was a colony, not a branch of the state.
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BUT
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--territorial contiguity with Russia makes it an atypical colony
\n--settled without much military violence since nomadic Kazakhs were already on the decline.
\n--Kazakhs were among the Muslim groups who could sort of Russify, like the Tatars and Bashkirs; they \"pushed these etho-racial boundaries to the limit.\"
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***Russians WEREN'T given the explicit privilege of other imperial Volk, or even a proper homeland-republic; this was on purpose, since \"Russian chauvinism\" was much afear'd. (Again, cf. Smith 1999). Rather, Russian privilege was covert—they were the \"civilized\" ones and everyone else was \"backwards\" and needed Big Brother's help.
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Carrot and stick methods—Soviets may have forcibly intervened in everyday life (ie forcing the Kazakhs to settle) but korenizatsia and new education also provided specific benefits for the ones who didn't die or emigrate; thus Kazakhs took part in the building of the Soviet state, within a framework forcibly imposed on them.
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YOU HAVE TO SUFFER FOR THE GLORIOUS SOVIET FUTURE. aka Marxist teleology predicts that everything is going to eventually get better.
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\"a failure of the Soviet state to integrate the non-Russian nations and and to transcend the colonial methods of group categorization and ethnic institutionalization.\" p20
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Not all colonies are equal; Kazakhstan never had to struggle for an identity, it was handed to them. Also, the whole Soviet method of nation-labelings was designed to mitigate the possibility of ethnic mobilization against them. p21
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***The whole idea of history as proceeding through a series of stages applies to cultures as well—you will eventually outgrow the need for your ethnic identity. Moreover, culture/ethnicity was something with objective exponents that could be scientifically defined, and individual expressions of culture were \"reified and folklorized.\" This concept of culture underpins a whole hepton of Soviet and post-Soviet ideology on ethnicity.
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The Bolsheviks devalued Arabic-script literary traditions, and the oral traditions of Kazakhs in particular; if you didn't have \"your own\" script, you didn't really have a language, did you? (Never mind that memorized poetry was the whole POINT of a lot of Kazakh literature...) p22
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p24: Subaltern Studies approach! 1. the Bolshevik method of top-down, modernity-obsessed, nationality-based state-building has become a blueprint for post-Soviet Kazakhstan 2. Independence is the starting point of nationhood. 3. Titular elites participated in their own domination and we have to understand how that worked. 4. Consider the marginalized (subaltern) groups, not just the elites, in how political orders come about.
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\"Although the Russians cannot be seen as self-conscious colonizers\"...
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p. 25 Central Asia was rife with patron-client networks, which allowed local elites (and party elites) to skim off the top. Moscow blamed this on their being not white enough.
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p.26-7 Adopting a stance of \"powerlessness\" (ie \"I'm a victim of the system, I had to collaborate to survive\") is a kind of self-defense; agency in inaction. Ethnic elites were simultaenously \"representatives\" of their nationalnost (chosen by moscow) and fellow subalterns, silenced by Soviet discourse. This is a weird dichotomy we also see in general from individual nationalnosti—they were privileged resident of a superpower but still marginalized within it.
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CHAPTA TWO
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Steppe nomadism is a unique way of life, but it went into \"irreversible decline\" once the farmers got better guns; nomadic 'empires' couldn't sustain themselves long-term, since the whole point of nomadism is that when shit gets real you MOVE. p29
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Tsarist policy towards Kazakhs included 'civilizing' them by offering educational opportunities to the elites—an option not offered to other Muslim peoples, who fit the colonization model better. These are the guys who later began to articulate a Kazakh national identity and realize they were oppressed. p30
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p30 – The Kazakhs and their steppe were RIGHT THERE, whereas the other Muslims were all WAY DOWN THERE; the Russians themselves weren't sure if they were colonizing the steppe or just incorporating it into their state.
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Two important points:
\n--The Russians couldn't have expanded if Kazakh nomadism wasn't already in decline
\n--The Kazakhs hated the Tsar, but not Russians in general, which is why the nationalists could join forces with the Bolsheviks without exploding from irony.
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p31 the term \"qazaq\" originally just mean the free people, aka the nomads, not an ethnic group; Russians just called them all kirgiz.
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p31-32 once the Kazakh Khanate fell apart, you had the three hordes
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p32 Original political organization of the Kazakhs involved an elite class of sultans, khans, judges (bi) and elders; khans were elected, but ruled by personal authority rather than institutional right
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p32 when the Tsars abolished the office of Khan in 1824 they had a carrot—access to Russian educational institutions (see ^) that co-opted the old elites
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p33 Kazakh society was organized around geneology, and the more generations back you knew your forefathers the better; not knowing at least seven generations back is STILL a bad thing. Symbolic status in the absence of literacy, Dave suggests.
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p33-34 nomadism is a technological response to an ecological problem (too little water for farming) but it comes with a lot of sociocultural exponents; even after being settled, there may still be cultural 'nostalgia' for nomadism.
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p34-35 nomads couldn't sustain military strength for long, and became economically dependent on settlers for certain resources. The hordes ended up swearing fealty to the tsar for mutual defense at different points in the 18thc and the incorporation was complete by the 19c (when Russian conquered Tashkent, Bukhara, etc.)
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35 the Tsarists saw Kazakh nomads as a nuisance, more like vermin than people in an \"empty\" land (echoed in the Virgin Lands initiative?) and Catherine II even sent Tatar mullahs as missionaries to try to \"civilize\" them. But Muslims weren't really part of the empire, and faced various kinds of legal discrimination. \"...integration into the Russian ('European') culture was deemed neither feasible nor desirable.\"
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35-36 the Russian Empire had fewer institutional structures of power in their hinterlands than other empires of the era; Central Asia in particular was \"under-governed\"
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p36 – Russians were ambivalent about their relationship with Europe, but at least they were definitely Europen in the eyes of the Muslims!
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36 also they had problems closer to home that attracted more resources than governing some muslimes in the desert, ie the industrializion of the former serfs
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36 same old song: the Russians drew administrative borders that ignored the actual tribal affiliations of Kazakhs and their migration patterns; tried to treat auls like permanent fixtures; generally instigated inter-clan conflicts.
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36-7 most of the Elder Horde clans were grouped together with Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, and thus became less Russified than the other hordes, which were ruled from Orenburg and West Siberia.
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37 Kazakhs were already facing an agricultural crisis in the 19c due to impoverished pastures; a variety of farmers moving into the region didn't help. (Cossacks, newly-liberated serfs, non-Orthodox Christians who didn't want to be converted, political prisoners....) Russians always favored the farmers over the nomads, displayed a stunning ignorance of how nomadism worked by trying to claim 'excess lands' and in general tried ot force Kazakhs to settle without taking any measures to make their settlement successful. GO BE A FARMER NOW ::hits with a hoe::
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38 the \"natural\" population density in the steppe was about five people per square mile, going as low as one person where water resources were scares. By 1916 three million settlers had arrived, roughly equal to the number of Kazakhs, but they were living much denser and forcing Kazakhs off the pastures.
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38 the categories of \"settled\" and \"nomad\" for the Turkic peoples were fluid, and there was interdependence there; even farmers could still claim nomadic ancestory and cultural ties, and it was the Russians who started ethnicizing this by labeling the settled population as \"Sarts.\"
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38-39 Premodern (pretsarist, here) concepts of identity are fluid and fuzzy for two reasons: one, not singularly tied to territory (though territory plays a role) and two, they weren't seen in an us-vs-them context (nobody thought of all the Kazakhs in the world, f'rinstace, or had tests of Kazakh-ness, or though about Kazakhness to the exclusion of any other way of identitfying.) All this came from Russia and their obsessive label-making.
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p39-40 Kazakhs were somehow \"less Muslim\" than the others, so civilizing them (even converting them!) was an option, hence the educational carrots; they could be educated and even proselytized to in Kazakh, but the goal was Russification.
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p40 Kazakhs used their greater access to imperial institutions to push the boundaries of what they were allowed to do; some even advocated for military service, while others saw it as a double-edged sword that would depopulate the steppe even further.
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p40 the imperial concepts of \"narodnost\" and \"nationalnost\" were interchangeable and based heavily on language; non-Russians ethnic groups had already started using them for self-designation and as the basis of anti-imperial struggle.
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p40 1924-5 Bolsheviks distinguish \"narodnost\" from \"nationalnost\" and give them 'scientific' definitions; 'nationalnost' is a proper ethnic group, while a narodnost lacks \"consolidation.\" Still based on language!
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p41 Argues the census was an instrument of ideology, since Kazakhs were forced to identify as Kazakhs rather than by zhuz or ru. Kazakh self-identification was based on culture and geneology, Soviet labeling based largely on language; language only became important when literacy was imposed.
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41 – Did the Kazakhs have an identity before the Soviets? Clearly, Dave is arguing yes.
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post-1991 lots of hullabloo about how Soviet institutions are what enabled the transition to independent statehood, as if the Kazakhs were a bunch of drooling anarchists without them.
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Kazakhs problematized the Slav-Muslim dichotomy, though, since so many of them were so clearly oriented towards Russia and \"Europe\" rather than the Islamic or even Turkic world. (Russia, not the Tsar—take note!)
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41-2 only at the turn of the 20century did we see political mobilization of the Kazaks
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42 Contact with settlers and economic shifts led to a new territorial consciousness among Kazakhs, and also a push for literacy.
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42-43 Alash Orda, the political-nationalist movement, actually ran an autonomous government from Orenburg 1917-19 but were eventually forced to cut a deal with the Bolsheviks, who needed support of \"the nationalities.\"
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43 Kazakhs teamed up with Tatars and Bashkirs calling for autonomy within Russia, not independence from it.
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first generation of Kazakh-writing poets arose in mid 1800s
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43-44 Kazakh nationalism was decentralised, with Russian-leaning strands in the north and Islam-leaning strands in the south (again based on administrative divisions). Also, it's kind of hard to be all nationalist and shit when you're working with nomads.
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44 the Kazakh intelligentsia numbered in the hundreds, and they were arguing among themselves about Big Issues with little reference to the shepherds on the ground.
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45 the Kazakhs in the steppe still operated on an oral tradition; we don't really know what they were saying around this period, or how they related it to Alash Orda's positions (preserved in print).
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45 categorizing the Kazakhs as illiterate was made possibly by ignoring literacy in Arabic scripts; Bolsheviks only wanted to talk about literacy in Cyrillic (Russian or Kazakh-in-Cyrillic) but Alash was pushing hard for Arabic-script literacy thru the 1920s; 48 argues that Bolsheviks were actively threatened by this, since it gave Kazakhs a sense of history and self-identity that wasn't under Bolshevik control.
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46 choice of script based on ideology; Arabic was too \"reactionary\" and religious for the Bolsheviks, Alash wanted it for cultural reasons (but not too similar to Tatar!) and Latinization (and later Cyrillic) ended up winning.
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46-47 Kazakhs ended up split on North/South (Orenburg/Tashkent, Alash/Ush Zhyz) lines, occasionally being a proxy for Menshevik/Bolshevik splits.
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48 Stalin would eventually purge members of Alash and the Jadidist movement, but they were key figures in incubating a Kazakh national identity.
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\"...the Soviet state conferred a fixed and essential property to what were fluid and resilient identity forms.\" They decried nomadism the same way other colonial powers decried tribalism as backward, self-defeating and without any kind of national consciousness.
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CHAPTA THREEEE
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p50-51 To what extent is Russian language an advantage (=plugged into a more international sphere of knowledge and commerce) vs. a sign of ethnic betrayal? Is the former a legacy of Soviet internationalism?
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52 the Soviets opened even more doors to Kazakhs, but then shoved them through whether they wanted to go or not...
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Dave encountered the difference between 'rodnoy yazyk' and \"the language we actually speak and use\" in the 1990s....
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52-3 differing estimates as to how many Kazakhs 'lacked proficiency' in 'their own' language, due to wildly differing methods of defining proficiency and how it was to be measured—40% being the most widely claimed figure, particularly by Qazaq Tili and nationalists who want to freak out about things (though a lower figure, 28%, is still not that comforting).
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53 Soviets didn't care about national languages, so they didn't bother trying to count them accurately. Instead, they were focused on \"bilingualism,\" meaning Russification, and there they collected good statistics: and Kazakhs claimed proficiency in Russian at almost twice the rate of the Kyrgyz, the highest in Central Asia (64%)
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53-4 Dave doesn't totally support her argument that proficiency in Russian = lack of knowledge of Kazakh, but it does seem to be the only metric available to her, and I suppose there's a decent basis.
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54 REMEMBER THE CENSUS LIES. 'Rodnoy yazik' had more to do with ascribed ethnic identity than actual repetoire of use! Second-generation urban Kazakhs were educated in Russian schools around Russian-speaking peers.
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54-5 Alash Orda originally wanted to maintain a semi-nomadic economy in their autonomous region, with livestock breeding and farming going hand in hand. Soviets saw this as utterly backwards, and also didn't like the fact that nomads could just fuck off if they felt like it, rather than submitting to ORDER.
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55 1920s saw violence between settlers and nomads over land access and water rights; local authorities tried to expel settlers and return pastures to nomads. Famines were breaking out.
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55 1925 start of the campaign of forced settlement and collectivisation. The bais of the Kazakhs were the equivalents of the Ukrainian kulaks; owning livestock was equivalent to owning land; and since the Ukrainians weren't turning over grain to the state fast enough, land in Kazakhstan needed to be put under cultivation to make up the shortfall.
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55 Kazakhs destroyed their own livestock rather than giving them up to the Bolsheviks—6.5 million head of cattle to less than 1, 18.5 million sheep to 1.5.
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55. In less than five years (1929-1933) went from 7.4% of Kazakhs \"settled\" to 95%, though how much of the jump involved mass starvation is anyone's guess.
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56 Official statistics vary from 2.3 million dead in the famine to \"just\" 1.7, depending on how you count; also debate over the extent to which the famine was engineered by the Bolsheviks vs. the endpoint of the crisis of nomadism (since pasturage and herd sizes had been shrinking anyway for years)
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56 Official census results showed that nearly 40% of Kazakhs were dead or fled from 1926 to 1937; that, plus five million dead Ukrainians, made Stalin annul the whole census.
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56-7 Cultural violence equaled the physical violence; Kazakhs lost their geneolgies, their auls, and their traditional (oral, memory-based) literature in favor of \"modern\" Soviet literacy and livestyles.
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56-7 Kazakhs are the descendants of Ghengis Khan, the mighty Steppe warriors, who have ended up small, marginalized, Russified and passive. Dave quotes an elderly woman: \"The sufferings and hardships of all these years have no made the people very fearful and quiescent. The Kazakhs today aren't who they used to be.\"
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57-8 Kazakhs simply did not live in towns pre-collectivization; the urban areas on the steppe were all fortresses and trading posts, and only a few educated Kazakhs in the service of the empire lived there. Orenburg probably had the most Kazakhs, but it was made part of the RFSR, and Tashkent part of Uzbekistan.
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58-9 A lot of Kazakhs lived on the edges of towns in yurts and stayed semi-nomadic rather than \"properly\" settling; as Kazakhstan was industrialized by the Soviets, impoverished Kazakhs became migratory laborers in a variety of industrial and construction fields, moreso than any other Central Asian ethnic group.
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59 Mass immigration of European ethnic groups throughout the Soviet years drastically changed the character of the republic; Soviets viewed it as \"empty,\" \"virgin,\" \"remote, uninhabited expanses\" that needed settling by \"pioneers.\"
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60 Quoting former party official on ethnic differences in KSSR: Europeans did all the 'real' work like farming, while \"[l]ocal Kazakhs, as 'gracious hosts, remained in the background.'\"
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61 Quotes a letter from a Kazakh to party officials describing Russians who didn't know and refused to deal with Kazakh; even doctors refused to treat KAzakh patients without an interpreter.
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60-61 While Uzbeks and Tajiks had a history of urbanization and their own urban enclaves, Kazakhs had no prior experience; urbanizing meant diving into a sea of Russian, living in some tiny apartment in a mikroraion and giving up tradition customs, like butchering a sheep for special occasions.
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61 \"Although popular accounts suggest that the Germans who had been deported to Kazakhstan during the Second World War had a better knowledge of Kazakh, we do not have data confirming this.\"
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61-2 The auls had their own problems, including shortages and sanitation issues; there were incentives to urbanization despite the cost.
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62 Kazakhs didn't want to send their kids to Kazakh schools, even in the city: the link between Russian schools and educational opportunities was already hard and fast. (Cf Smith and the stupidly underfunded national schools of Turkestan?)
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62-4 discussion of Korenizatsia and its decline, same or better in Smith.
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63-4 For a generation, many people never learned to write Kazakh in cyrillic; many cyrillic typewriters didn't even have keys for Kazakh letters, so you had to draw them in by hand; next generation of Kazakhs were cut off from arabic-script literacy of the 19c and early 20c, except the ones that somebody decided to transliterate.
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64: Kazakhs put their kids in Russian-medium schools after the Law on Education at a higher rate than any other ethnic group in the USSR
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65: by 1955, Higher education was done in Russian, dissertations had to be written in Russian, \"Kazakh-language schooling was increasingly perceived as a dead-end formula.\"
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65-6 Europeans (who didn't know Kazakh) dominated a lot of the social sciences, especially Turcology and linguistics, because for Kazakhs to do these things was \"nationalist.\" For anyone to suggest a European who didn't know Kazakh couldn't teach or study Kazakh linguistics was not \"internationalist\" and contrary to \"the friendship of peoples.\"
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66: Quoting an informant, who was quoting her father: \"Kazakh schools exist only to prepare us to go to one of the vocational training schools [proftechuchilische] or study through correspondence courses so that we continue to work in the kolkhoz. They [Russians] don't want to do this work and don't want us to leave the aul.\"
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66: Kazakhs who didn't speak good Russian ended up studying in Tashkent instead.
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67: Decline of Kazakh language mirrored by actions taken against Kazakh customs: KAzakh lacked prestige, as did eating at a dastarkhan, eating beshbarmak with your hands, and eating sunflower seeds in public.
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67 Speaking Kazakh in front of Russians was rude! And also maybe nationalist!
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68 Kazakh officials had to show \"internationalism\" by speaking Russian and supporting Russian.
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68 Most imperial powers deliberately restricted subalterns' access to the European languages; the Soviets did the opposite, one of the carrots they offered after beating Kazakhs with the collectivization stick.
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68: ideology of Russian hegemony: it's cultured, modern, egalitarian, and allows for mobility to the highest levels of society.
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69: Kazakhs attacked other Kazakhs for nationalism, especially within the Kazakh CP; being seen as internationalist was good for one's career.
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69-70 Mankurtism is an inevitable consequence of dislocation; Russian was a survival tool and all the old exponents of Kazakh-ness were gone. Mankurtism wasn't even a thing until the Soviet Union was gone and had clearly bailed on its promise of salvation/bright future; by that time, Kazakhs had already internalized Russian/Soviet discourses.
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CHAPTA FAAAAHR
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p71 Rosa the librarian: \"How could the Kazakhs...ever have developed a sense of nationalism?\"
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p71-2 Even the protests against Gennadii Kolbin were presented in non-ethnic terms. \"Overall, the testimonies of the Kazakhs conveyed the self-image of a quiescent people, a small nation that has never displayed nationalist traits linked to territorial or cultural conquests or a desire for domination and control.\"
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72 Korenizatsia/\"affirmtive action\" type programs created a sense of entitlement, also helped remedy the dislocation of forced settlement and came hand-in-hand with presupposed Kazakh \"backwardness.\"
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72 \"The socialist state's preferential disbursement...paved the way for the emergence of a defensive, entitlement-based nationalism.\"
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72 Paradox: ethnicity was pervasive within the system, but political nationalism or anything that whiffed of it was taboo; thus the elites/intelligentsia didn't protest Kolbin
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72-3 The modern Kazakh intelligentsia is still the Soviet-nurtered intelligensia; elites are still largely Soviet elits. No wonder they seem to lack a \"national imagination\" or put forth more than a superficial idea of \"national culture;\" they've been actively trained against it.
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73 Stalinist criteria for what made a nation: territory, language, \"common economic mode of life\" and national character, whatever that was—all of which were determined objectively by others, based largely on stereotypes, with no room for self-determination by members of the culture.
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73 Stalin's goal for Central Asia was to skip capitalism entirely and jump straight into the Soviet bright future.
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73-4 Korenizatsia, affrimative action on steroids; actually just trying to head off nationalist uprisings by creating indigenous CP infrastructure. Stalin cautioned that this was not nationalism, just a way of making the state \"rodoi i blizkoi k serdtsu; there simply weren't enough Russians speaking Kazakhs or Kazakhs capable of taking over administrative jobs to ensure that all business was done in Kazakh, but it was good PR and helped create a sense of entitlement.
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76 CP officials sent in from outside Kazakhstan brought massive entourages (\"xvosti\") rather than work with local cadres; this helped foster interethnic tensions.
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76 \"Many officials in Moscow essentially saw native Kazakhs as unfit to govern their own affairs and attributed the shortcomings of 'cultural construction' in the republic to the fact that 'its people veered between a state of semi-barbarism and most glaring barbarism.'\"
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^ S. Dimanshtein (1936) Itogi razresheniia natsionalnovo voprosa v SSSR. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vlast Sovetov pri Prezidiume VTsIK.
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76-7 Soviet authorities initially purged \"nationalists\" meaning \"Russian chauvenists;\" later they turned on \"local nationalists\" and canceled korenizatsia policies, because OMG THE NATIONALITIES ARE COMING. The resulting purges took out nearly all the pre-Soviet intelligensia, even the ones they kind of needed.
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77 You can't seriously pursue korenizatsia anyway when there's mass famines and flights across the border; claims 1 in 4 Kazakhs dead or fled in the 30s.
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Korenizatsia worked in other republics, sometimes a little too well (leading to more nationalism than the state could tolerate); in Kazakhstan all it did was establish the idea of titular entitlement.
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Citing Fierman: Moscow liked the idea that the jumped-up Kazakhs were uneducated, poor and blindly obedient; better than some uppity nationalist, right? (Fierman 1991, Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation. Boulder, CO: Westview.
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77-8 \"The principle that the party and the government should reflect the ethnic composition of a territory and the offer of recognition to the titular nationality remained a core element of Soviet policies. … The twin ideas that republics must bear an ethnic face and the titular language be accorded priority had already acquired a popular resonance.\"
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78 1954: Khruschev once again declares the steppe to be Virgin Lands, despite all the people living there: more settlers show up, Kazakhs fall to 30% of the population. \"Laboratory of the friendship of nations,\" yeah.
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\"Colonial-type ethnicity-based occupation pattern,\" where Russians controlled the economy and high political offices (often appointed from Moscow) while Kazakhs filled the service sector, clerical positions, or continued to work with livestock.
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78-9 Staring in the 1960s, european immigration slowed and even reversed; meanwhile, Kazakh birthrates spiked, and you had the first cadre of proper Soviet Kazakhs who could fill administrative and political office. By 1989 Kazakhs had risen to 40% of the population and fulled 70% of seats in the Council of Ministers.
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79 Ethnicity trumped almost everything else when it came to getting into vuzy or the gov't; nationalnost was stamped on ID, requested on forms, and could be inferred by surname, place of birth, etc. This was in spite of official policy of negating nationality-based differences.
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79-80 Kazakhs in administrative posts were seen as \"jumped up\" from Moscow, since the industrial workers were still mostly European; they obviously didn't have the right ideological education and were only going to use their powers for backwards, tribal goals.
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80 Widely assumed that Kazakhs were constitutionally incapable of living and working in cities, because it's their nationalnost and that's objective and immutable, rather than an inability to get plugged into the urban network of goods and services.
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81 \"To Russian settlers...it seemed inconceivable during the early phase of Kazakhstan's sovereign statehood that Kazakhs could run their factories, live in cities and eventually take charge or their country. ...Russians as a group shared the perception of Kazakhs as less competent, ill-suited to cultivating land or working in the industrial sector and lacking complex scientific or technical skills, whereas they saw themselves as hardworking, capable and skilled. Kazakhs in turn blamed Russians for having abused the hospitality of their hosts by grabbing the best lands, housing and jobs.\"
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The more the central government tried to achieve parity among ethnic groups, the more aware those ethnic groups were of inequalities; \"The socialist ontology that saw all nations as equals had sharpened awareness among groups of their own relative status and standing vis-a-vis members of other nationalities.\"
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81-2 Generally Kazakhs were given symbolically-important figurehead leadership positions, Slavs the \"deputy\" position that held real power; this pissed off both sides.
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82 \"culture of quotas and subsidies\" deepened resentments
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83 \"The rising levels of education and material parity among Kazakhs came to challenge the developments and civilizing role of Russians.\" \"As the socialist system sought to dismantle developmental disparities, it was the Russians and 'Europeans' as a whole, who increasingly came to see themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the national republics.\"
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Kazakhs were challenging their own \"backwards\" status by effectively using the Soviet system to advance themselves—well, at least some of them were.
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84 Dinmukhamed Kunaev was the first Muslim in the politburo and ruled KZ for over twenty years; he established a new indigenization and increased the autonomy of the KZCP.
\n\n
1986 protests weren't about nationalism per se, but about Moscow breaking the \"rules\" of power-sharing and stirring up the status quo. (Which had been Gorbachev's aim all along, right?) They didn't want to lose entitlements for Kazakhs or the existing patron-client system.
\n\n
Kazakh elites were clients of Moscow; as long as they followed orders and didn't start shit, they could have their own client networks.
\n\n
85-86 Krushchev wanted to reorganize borders, \"circulate\" cadres (and their xvosti) and generally stir shit up—as long as it benefitted Moscow and not the republics. Brezhnev, who had served the Part in KZ, was opposed and wanted to continue the current system.
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86-7 Brezhnev as First Secretary protected Kunaev, who could pretty much rule as he wanted and hand out goodies to his favorites (fellow Elder Horde, mostly.)
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87 Reigning in the Central Asians was a priority for Andropov and Gorbachev; they systematically forced out Brezhnev's clients, but Kunaev was the toughest.
\n\n
Clans had acquired a new but illicit salience for Kazakhs; on one hand, talking about your clan was dangerous and \"nationalist,\" but on the other it was one route for access/patronage/gettin er done, especially in the constipated and beshortaged Soviet state. Moscow knew this, so they tried to manipulate clan structure while also denouncing it in public.
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88 Gorbachev tried to dismantle Kunaev's system, but couldn't come up with a suitable candidate for first secretary from within the KZCP. Appointing an outsider looked like a good move at the time.
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88-9 Nazarbaev came to power by sucking up to Moscow while at the same time milking Kunaev's network and Elder Horde membership; forced out rivals, shifted blame for the 1986 riots to the KGB and made it into the Politburo.
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89 Nazarbaev never coded the '86 riots in ethnic terms; even in power his administration was ambivalent about whether to frame the riots as nationalist or not.
\n\n
Zheltoqsan is a nationalist group explicitly pushing a nationalist reading of the riots; accuse Nazarbaev of complicity in the use of force against protestors.
\n\n
89-90 by letting Zheltoqsan register as a proper organization, Nazarbaev co-opted their vague nationalism and neutered their potential harm to his administration.
\n\n
92-3 How could good little communists suddenly swap ideologies and become good little nationalists? Most of Dave's informants don't answer, or just suggest that aqsaqals get uncritical respect, or that Kazakhs have bigger worries. Dave sees in this a sense of \"collective ethnic obligations\" and a perception of dissent as a privilege requiring an \"exit strategy,\" like Jews who could flee to Israel if things got real.
\n\n
93-4 \"The children of the victims of these [Stalinist] purges seized educational and professional opportunities and participation in the construction of socialism as the best means of overcoming their victimization.\" Livelyhood depended on complicity.
\n\n
94 no distinction between self-preservation and self-interest-maximization; agents of coercion and the beneficiaries of entitlements were all building Communism together.
\n\n
94-5 titular elites saw themselves, or at least projected themselves, as powerless subalterns whose only hope was to work the system; Nazarbaev didn't benefit from communism, he just survived it!
\n\n
\"A disengagement from ethnic or political action and risk aversion formed the precondition for survival at every level.\"
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95 \"If in the Soviet era, titular elites were able to manufacture legitimacy by assuming the posture of being subalterns and representing themselves of a humbe social or class ancestry, then in the post-Soviet period these are achieved by projecting the image of having tactically empowered themselves by collaborating with the Russian-dominated Soviet 'empire' in order to serve as custodians of national culture and interests.
\n\n
CHAPTER FIIIIVE
\n\n
96 Even though there was widespread opposition to Kazakh as a state language and a huge nonKazakhspeaking segment of the population, Russian was never* endowed as a state language (as of Dave's writing).
\n\n
97 Language politics are played out in a symbolic domain that doesn't affect anyone's actual repetoire.
\n\n
97 Argues that ethnicity, not language, is a key factor in advancement—language is an exponent of ethnicity, but unlike Ukraine or Moldova, it's not a decisive one (since Kazakhs and Slavs have so many other points of distinction.)
\n\n
Nazarbaev called the language issue \"resolved.\" What does that even mean, given the still very visible presence of Russian?
\n\n
Language is the \"quintessential entitlement issue\" since it combines material and symbolic concerns. (quoting Horowitz, 1985, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley)
\n\n
97-8 \"By treating culture as an objective and material possession of a nation, the socialist state reduced it to a static and essential trait. This understanding of culture as an observable and homogenized group attribute, and as a marker of objective difference between nations, paradoxically conferred a powerful emotive salience to the Kazakh language revival campaign.\"
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98 The symbolic power of language is its link to the speakers and their fate; \"if there is no language, there is no nation.\" (til bolmasa, el bolmaidi.)
\n\n
Elevating an ethnic language over a colonial language is a common populist policy for the elites of post-colonial states, even if they don't speak that language well themselves; cf. Kuchma learning Ukrainian.
\n\n
99 Language Law of 1989 was purely symbolic—too few people knew or used Kazakh for it to have meaning, just copying other republics.
\n\n
Kazakh revival spearheaded by \"cultural entrepeneurs\" who invoked images of rural/nomadic life; they stood to gain if they could pull off a shift, but had to do it without undermining themselves or alienating key Russian-speakers in the process.
\n\n
Three interlocking arguments for Kazakh: \"restoration of the Kazakhs' 'historical' status in their ancestral homeland\" because all ethnic groups were autochthonous to Stalin; \"claims for entitlement and affirmative action...and state security concerns.\"
\n\n
99-100 Death of a language = death of the people; making Russian a state language is implicitly making Kazakhstan part of Russia, since territory=language=nation.
\n\n
100 Kazakh would die out in a bilingual situation because Russian is already hegemonic; evokes Rivers' \"subtractive bilingualism\" here?
\n\n
Multinationality and cultural plurism, yes, but codified bilingualism predicted to be politically disasterous.
\n\n
101 Dave argues that defining Russian as a language of interethnic communication removed incentives for Russophones to learn Kazakh, since it implied that Kazakh was only for Kazakhs talking to each other.
\n\n
Laws of 1995 and 1996 pushed back Kazakhification efforts, allowed the use of Russian for any official purpose—so de facto bilingualism, de jure Kazakh-primacy.
\n\n
101-2 Kazakhstan was in a state of political and ethnic flux at this point—parliament was the freest it would ever be, but migrations were huge in both directions. Nazarbaev grabbed power in '95 and most of the pro-bilingualism deputies in the Mazhilis were forced out or emigrated.
\n\n
102 the \"Law on Languages\" in Russian (zakon o yazykax) is the \"Law on Language\" (til turaly zang) in Kazakh! Is this a mistake or deliberate sleight of hand?
\n\n
LoL of 1997 puts Russian \"on par with / naravne s\" Kazakh, protects other minority languages, and mandates 50% of broadcast media in Kazakh.
\n\n
103 The LoL is seen as less extreme than some countries (cf. Baltics and their citizenship hijinx) and is one of the signs that Nazarbaev is an interethnic genius who saved the state from conflict. Dave argues he actually systematically excluded Russians from power, minimizing their ability to activatize on their own behalf.
\n\n
Russian outmigration from Kazakhstan wasn't new—it had been going on since 1975—but it accelerated in the 90s and the language issue was one of several factors. (Though \"ethnic unmixing\" happens in a lot of collapsing multi-ethnic states.)
\n\n
Argues that Russians saw no future for their families in Kazakhstan, which is why they emigrated if they could; vs. the Baltics, where language shenanigans couldn't trump the better economy. (Cf somebody I've read somewhere!!!) The fact that exit is even an option helps defuse ethnic tensions.
\n\n
Argues that in Kazakhstan, \"social class and ethnic origins are seen as broadly congruent, and ethnic groups are hierarchically ordered within a single system with mobility opportunities shaped by group identity.\" This isn't formalized anywhere but sure seems salient.
\n\n
104 Political status != prestige (Woolard, 1989, Double Talk.) It's not about changing anyone's repetoire (Dave claims) but about endowing Kazakh with enough social capital as a rare and precious resource to extract gains from it. \"Kazakh was seen as a vital cultural resource exclusively possessed by the Kazakhs and unavailable to Russian-speakers.\" The commodification issue, good ol' Monica Heller.
\n\n
Kazakhs claimed nearly universal proficiency in Kazakh, but the fact that they don't actually use it proves them wrong; cf. Estonia, where people really did switch over almost instantly to Estonian as soon as they had the chance.
\n\n
104-5 Nazarbaev dismissed the idea that monologinual Russophones had any issues, since \"all citizens of Kazakhstan are Russian-speakers\" ...
\n\n
105 Demography was supposed to save Kazakhs: youth bulge, and higher birthrates projected to a population of 12 million by 2010. This was off by 4 million, but whatevs.
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105-6 Russophone Kazakhs don't dare speak out, or they get slammed as mankurts or Russified; Olzhas Suleimenov tried and was basically exiled as \"Ambassador\" to Italy.
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106 Passing a law on language is easy; actually changing language repetoirs is hard.
\n\n
107 Argues that a hard push for Kazakh would've resulted in the biggest conflict between different groups of Kazakhs—the urbanized Russophones and the rural, closer-to-monolingual Kazakhophones. (Russians wouldn't have figured since, due to Kunaev, they had stopped really competeing for or expecting high-level official positions since the 1970s. They thus soft-pedaled the law, meaning it did little to change sociolinguistic repetoirs.
\n\n
107-8 No official tests of Kazakh proficiency (except for the highest political offices, which is more about excluding the opposition) and no jobs actually require it; deadlines to switch to Kazakh have been scrapped.
\n\n
108-9 No coordination of different efforts to establish Kazakh as a common state language; a lot of ad-hoc work and people working at cross-purposes, or at least not coordinating their efforts for one reason or another.
\n\n
109-10 With the Committee on the Implementation of the State Language, \"Kazakh authorities have isolated the language issue from he overall societal context. Government committees involved in language administration tend to be remarkably insulated, even in more democratic contexts, functioning in blissful isolation from society, as well as from other departments and agencies.\" (CITE Hans Raj Dua, 1996. \"The politics of language conflict: implications for language planning and political theory.\" LAnguage problems and language planning, 20(1), pp1-17.)
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110 On pushes to function in Kazakh: legal loopholes (like Russian's \"interethnic\" status) allowed Kazakh to be sidelined; pushes to translate everything into Kazakh don't help when the Russian versions still exist.
\n\n
ANYTHING KAZAKH DOES, RUSSIAN DOES (BETTER?)
\nEVERYTHING KAZAKH DOES, RUSSIAN DOES TOO
\nNO IT CAN'T
\nYES IT CAN
\nNO IT CAN'T
\nYES IT CAN
\nNO IT CANT NO IT CANT NO IT CAAAAAAAAANT
\n\n
\"The eroding global status of Russian has led both the elites and the younger generation to invest efforts int learning English, rather than simply turning to Kazakh.\" What about 2030?
\n\n
111 Parents want their kids to know English more than they give a shit about Kazakh vs. Russian, or so Dave says. Is this really a subversion of the language policy?
\n\n
Claims: private education is enhancing the visibility of foreign languages; Kazakh-medium schools and universities are using English (inc. english-medium lessons) as a marketing tactic; political elites ornament their Russian with Kazakh for show, take lessons in both Kazakh and English; command of Kazakh is necessary for symbolic and certain interpersonal functions, but Russian still functions as the getting-things-done language.
\n\n
Speak Kazakh, but not too much Kazakh, or you're a nationalist; speak no Kazakh, though, and you're an internationalist. Just enough Kazakh to be patriotic!
\n\n
112 \"If Rusophone Kazakhs have symbolically acquiesced to the language policies, it is largely because they have not encountered any major economic, professional or social pressure to use Kazakh actively. … the primary value of Kazakh is as an instrument of nationalization, rather than as a cultural or identity symbol.\"
\n\n
112-3 Question Eight of the 1999 census: graded responses to \"Do you know the State Language?\" followed by \"What other languages are you fluent in?\" with up to two responses optional. But \"knoweldge\" was defined as the ability to use it orally, with no regard to reading or writing.
\n\n
114 Since no Kazakh is going to self-report not knowing Kazakh (sanely) \"we can surmise that the Kazakhstani state is less interested in capturing the actual patterns of linguistic behavior, than it is in procuring the necessary statistics to demonstrate the 'steady success' of its ethno-linguistic policies.\"
\n\n
\"What the state has failed to achieve in actual practice has been attained through statistics.\" Kazakhs no longer have to worry about language loss because, surprise! Everybody knows Kazakh!
\n\n
The LoL 1997 was meant to neuter the language issue, not to solve it; Nazarbaev doesn't have the kind of broad social support he needs to actually go around changing the culture.
\n\n
114-5 It's not that the state couldn't afford to push Kazakh harder (in terms of material resources)--after all, they moved the capital even though people weren't getting paid.
\n\n
115 LoL punts the issue to the people—it's their job to learn Kazakh, the state's done all it can do. (This is really interesting from a human-rights perspective!)
\n\n
Is this just another area where Nazarbaev punts? Also trying to reduce social welfare spending, Dave argues. \"The state has attempted to relegate much of its responesibilities to society, without empowering it to play an active and prominent role.\"
\n\n
115-6 Another argument: the Soviet \"Social contract\" is that the state will provide you with basic necessities, and then leave you alone, if you play at observing state rules, and then leave IT alone (ie political disengagement for individual liberty). So most people don't WANT Nan futzing with their language repetoires.
\n\n
116 This is how the language law has been implemented: the state doesn't actually enforce them, and the people don't actually obey them, but enough symbolic compliance/enforcement on both ends allows everyone to go home happy.
\n\n
116-7 This gets the state off the hook, since if they can fake widespread Kazakhification they don't have to actually do anything about it (or even figure out if if it's true.)
\n\n
THE NUMBERS MAKE IT TRUE
\nI AM THE WALRUS AND IGNORANCE IS FREEDOM
\n\n
OK CHAPTER SEEX NOW
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118 Kazakhstan was ripe for internethnic conflict, maybe outright insurrection—Kazakhs a minority, Russian majorities in northern oblasts, Russia RIGHT THERE and Kazakhstan economically dependent on it.
\n\n
118-9 WHY wasn't there a big Russian uprising? Why did they all just leave?
\n\n
119 Nazarbaev himself talked up the threat of interethnic conflict, then took the credit when it didn't materialize
\n\n
Dave's argument: Russians didn't have the ability to mobilize for their rights, much less for secession; there was no real basis for a \"clash of civilizations\" fight since Kazakhs were so Russified.
\n\n
120 Kazakhstan's elites viewed the 'ethnic question' and ethnicity in general along the same ideological lines as the Soviets.
\n\n
\"The regime's conversion of Russian disgruntlement and diffuse demands by Slavic and Cossak leaders for 'autonomy,' for a formal institutional structure ensuring their visibility and representation within the new state, and for cultural, linguistic and legal guarantees of their rights into a 'threat' to the nascent statehood of Kazakhstan proved to be critical in defining the subsequent choice of policies and institutions.\" Over-emphasized the most extreme cases, highlighted anyone's use of terms like 'separatism' and equated autonomy=secession.
\n\n
120-1 \"The Soviet ethno-federal framework was designed primarily to offer symbolic self-determination to non-Russian nations in order to deter the potential for ethnic mobilization. ...over time, the very institutions created by the state to deter an ethnic and societal mobilization produced subversive effects that eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet ethno-federal structure.\"
\n\n
121 This legacy of \"symbolic self-determination\" is what drove calls for ethnic autonomy within the new republics ie Transdnistria
\n\n
Russians were \"the awkward nationality\" (Martin 2001) and didn't have a sense of territorialization—to them, the whole USSR was home, until it wasn't.
\n\n
(They wanted their privilege encoded in law and it wasn't, boo hoo.)
\n\n
\"Almost all ethnic mobilizations during the glasnost era and the post-Soviet period have occurred via existing Soviet-created institutional channels.\"
\n\n
122 ^That is, minorities that weren't recognized in the Soviet period still aren't getting recognized, while groups that were recognized are still recognized whether or not that matters.
\n\n
\"Ethno-territorial gerrymandering\": merging certain oblasts together had the net effect of diluting Russian's political power: ie adding Zhez to Karaghandy dilluted Russian-majority Karaganda. Also made the oblasts larger, and thus harder to secede with.
\n\n
123 Various motives for creating Astana, including influencing Russians, making ties with Russified Kazakhs and the Middle Horde, and Almaty being an earthquake zone right by China. Became a locus of internal migration from south to north, helping to dillute Russianness of the surrounding oblasts.
\n\n
Wait, so now she trusts the census data when it shows a KAzakh majority in the \"risky\" oblasts? Doesn't the same principle as the language data apply—it doesn't matter if it's true as long as we can prove it?
\n\n
Russians (ie Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn) saw the KSSR as a \"Gift\" to the territory-less nomads.
\n\n
124 \"tendency among Kazakh officials to see the Soviet-drawn borders as the 'natural' boundaries of the Kazakh nation,' even though it includes places Kazakhs have been lived (ie Oskemen) and excludes places they did (ie Orenburg).
\n\n
Government jumped on any hint of nationalism to cry wolf, but there was little public unrest or separatism.
\n\n
History of coding any kind of inter-ethnic conflict as \"hooliganism\" or \"drunkenness\" going back to 1920s, since it would not jive with \"internationalism.\"
\n\n
\"Overall, the pattern of industrial and urban growth in Kazakhstan had reduced the economic and sociocultural distance between Russians, other Russian-speaking groups...and Kazakhs, contributing to a much greater social homogeneity.\"
\n\n
125 Urban Kazakhs in the north and east were more Russified than the majority groups in the south and west.
\n\n
Public mobilizations by Slavic groups had an \"internationalist\" character that appeared equally to Kazakhs; they attacked issues of common cause, like getting pensions paid on time, or framed their ethno-cultural demands in familiar Soviet terms like Russian schools and Russian media. The state language issue was one of the few times they had to address the framework of Kazakhstan sovereignty and their place within it.
\n\n
125-6 \"Russians in Kazakhstan evidently share an unequivocal sense of cultural and civilizational superiortity, along with a firm belief in their own decisive contribution in transforming the Kazakhs from a 'tribde' to a nation and in laying the foundation of a modern Kazakh state.\"
\n\n
126 \"This is paradoxically a testimony to the fact that the Soviet state went much farther than many other colonial rules in institutionalizing the structure of titular preferences in the republics, while preserving a strategic presence of ethnic Russians.\"
\n\n
Russian identity is weird: it has imperial, national and even local characteristics, because Russians were the \"state-defining people\" of the USSR but also one among several, hypothetically equal nationalities. Anti-Russian sentiment in KZ has focused on the imperial face of Russianness (cf. \"Russian speakers can't possibly have any problems here\") while Russians try to cope with a stunted national face (since they never had a territory or the national accoutrements that other nationalnosts got.) How do regional identites (ie Almatinka) survive when the state changed hands?
\n\n
127 \"Mama tatarka, otets grek, a ya russkiy chelobek\"-- 'Russian' was a composite and assimilatory identity favored in mixed marriages.
\n\n
Russians saw themselves as Soviets still in the 90s, not citizens of Russia or Kazakhstan; but the USSR was an extention of Russia, so to Russia we will go (it's better than hanging about with the dirty Kazakhs and we have no outlet for separatism).
\n\n
127-8 Millions of Russian speakers left Kazakhstan for Russia or Germany; 1994-6 was a 'tipping point' during which 1.8 million migrated. This is comparable to states that had civil wars, like Tajikistan, but for vastly different reasons: they just saw no future for themselves or their kids there.
\n\n
128 \"The Kazakhstani state has sought to deter the coalescence of a common Russian-speaking identity by encouraging an ethnic and linguistic revival among the minorities, as well as a process of ethnic 're-identification' among the sub-groups that share a broad Russian-speaking identity.\"
\n\n
Russians weren't a very organized group to begin with; they were looking to Russia for aid (up) rather than each other (grass-roots) and there was a lot of interpersonal conflict between different leaders.
\n\n
129 State harassment of key Russian leaders pushed them to emigrate, which decapitated the movement.
\n\n
Russian advocacy groups were pushed to issues of emigration, like trying to get dual citizenships and a more open border, rather than issues of state-building, like the language issue; Russians were looking outward.
\n\n
Laws limit rallies, require registration of public organizations and penalize 'nationalism' or 'inciting ethnic discord,' silencing ethnic minorities.
\n\n
130: the Pugachev Incident of 1999: arrest of thirteen Russians allegedly plotting to overthrow the EKO and turn it into an autonomous republic; probably largely staged by Kazakh authorities (at least the part where they had explosives) but provided a pretext for more \"anti-separatism\" and state security.
\n\n
Lingering \"neo-Soviet\" view of ethnicity: it's homogenous and bounded, culture is apolitical, and there can be only one organization or committee representing an ethnic group, which the state gets to pick. Organizations like Lad didn't make the cut since \"Slavic\" isn't a proper ethnic group.
\n\n
131 Neo-Soviet ethnic management avoids the term \"minority\" and its connotations, since all nationalnosts are equal! Also, Western-style \"liberalness\" would destabilize the status quo and/or lead to assimilation of all ethnic groups; also Kazakhs can't be a majority because they're still the subalterns.
\n\n
\"Kazakhstan's nationalizing state framework rests on the self-perception that the titular group is a 'weak' and 'young' nation, in need of remedial action by the state.\"
\n\n
The Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan: supposed to be a body that protects minoritity rights, but it has no actual power and Nazarbaev mainly uses it to reward his buddies with some token status/title
\n\n
132 Most of what the Assembly does is political theatre, giving tchotchkes to the President and talking about how awesome he is; nobody can refuse membership and no members can engage in political activity.
\n\n
\"The notion that each nationality has a historical homeland has effectively reduced non-titular groups to the status of diasporas.\" Minorities are supposed to get help from their \"Homelands,\" and too bad if your homeland sucks.
\n\n
133 Kazakhstani law now allows people to change their official nationality, and they've been encouraging ethnic Russians of mixed ancestry to pick another one
\n\n
Building a Kazakhstani-Ukrainian identity on \"shared suffering\" under Stalin?
\n\n
134 Appealing to, say, Ukrainians as a \"divide and conquer\" strategy vs. Lad's panSlavism.
\n\n
Co-opted ethnic Russians in the government get there through patronage—the \"fourth zhuz,\" unsuited for ethnic leadership.
\n\n
135 \"there is no formal mechanism for institutionalizing a territorially imagined Kazakhstani identity that can take precedence over ethno-national markers.\"
\n\n
There can be no civic state without some measure of political freedom, which Nan is scared of.
\n\n
Kazakhs are doing in KZ what Russians did in the USSR—they are the state-defining people, and everybody else is their guest.
\n\n
135-6 \"In reality, the state-sponsored discourse on ethnic harmony and civic peace has efficiently held in check what it regards as displays of ethnic, racial or religious sectarianism, as well as titular nationalism.\"
\n\n
136 It's the patromonial-authoritarian state that stands in the way of a civic discourse.
\n\n
137 The OSCE views minorities as a security concern in the FSU, and Kazakhstan enthusiastically upholds this discourse, treating minorities like a threat; this blocks any campaign for minority rights. \"By placing placing minority issues within the framework of national and regional security, the Kazakhstani government has relegated questions of justice and right of minorities to a secondary plane.\"
\n\n
^ Kymlicka, Will, 2001. \"Western political theory and ethnic relations in EAstern Europe.\" In Kymlicka and Opalski, Can liberal pluralism be exported? Oxford: OUP.
\n\n
\"...a zero-sum conception of the relationship between the new nationalizing state and non-titular groups or minorities.\"
\n\n
137-8 \"This perspective resonates with the view of state authorities that ethnic groups inherently strive towards maximizing autonomy and self-determination rather than integrateion, and that ethnic claims, unless contained from the top-down, are insurrectionary and boundless.\"
\n\n
138 \"Minorities tend to act within te same distorted system of values as the titular nation, clinging on to an ethnic understanding of self-determination even as they challenge the 'ethnocratc' character of the new states.\" So either the Russians or the Kazakhs are going to go extinct here, and there can be no compromise!
\n\n
\"When the language of 'rights' and 'justice' is weak, minorities recognize that informal bargaining and the pursuit of patronage are more viable mechanisms of obtaining recognition\" than working within the law.
\n\n
139 Kazakhstan lost about 8% of its population due to emigration of non-Kazakhs; Dave blames this on \"civic apathy\" due to Nazarbaev's style of government.
\n\n
The state have become too rich off oil to be pressured from the outside; Nazarbaev knows how to work a crowd, ie the purely symbolic Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, and can probably continue to play nicely with the West without doing anything substantive.
\n\n
Predicts a purely nationalist Kazakhstan would've devolved into conflicts between clans and zhuzes—on what grounds?
\n\n
Neo-Soviet tools of ethnic management: titular entitlement, internationalism, and \"civic\" meaning whatever the hell we want it to mean.
\n\n
CHAPTER SEBEN
\n\n
140 Transition to capitalism has benefited the pre-existing elites without providing any kind of competition.
\n\n
141 Nazarbaev and his extended network control the government and economy.
\n\n
Key differences between postcolonial Africa and postsoviet Asia: rapid centralization of power to the titular elites through capitalist processes, strong states with extensive coercive abilities.
\n\n
142 Brubaker, Rogers 1996 Nationalism Reframed on ex-Soviet states: organized around a core nation, which is construed as oppressed or subaltern to justify using state power to benefit that nation specifically.
\n\n
143 \"Overall, KAzakhstan has produced a distinct brand of 'stability' based on economic prosperity and civic disengagement of its citizenry that is also reassuring to prominent Western companies whichhave made huge investments in the country's oil and mining industries, as well as to its powerful neighbors Russia, China and Uzbekistan.\" Uz?!
\n\n
Lots of Kazakhs were afraid of the free market for ethnic reasons: assumed that the sterotypical Kazakh is bad at business (too generous, timid, etc) and that other ethnic groups would somehow have an in with their coethnics abroad.
\n\n
145 There were some oligarchs/independent entreneurs in the early 90s, but they've been mostly neutralized, and the old elites have ended up grabbing the main share of the profits of privatizThe ation. (\"prikhvatizatsia,\" or \"snatching,\" not \"privatizatsiya.\") You can't do business without the patronage of the right people.
\n\n
Nazarbaev keeps the oblast heads under his direct control; no direct elections and he tends to swap them out every few years just in case.
\n\n
147 There is simply no way for a business to operate outside the patronage network; no independent economic force any more than there's independent political force.
\n\n
148 \"Political patronage and successful entrepeneurial activism are not only closely entwined, but operate together in a mutually enforcing relationship.\"
\n\n
150 \"These business groups and networks wield direct control over the legislative and executive bodies by sponsoring political parties loyal to the President. ...these groups pledge loyalty to the President and serve as channels for disbursing spoils.\"
\n\n
151 \"The speed as well as the ease with which the Kazakhs have occupied numerous positions in all spheres of administraion and public life, replace, and in several cases displacing, Russians and other non-titular groups...\"
\n\n
152 Kazakhs have been represented in politics and administration at rates wildly disproportionate to their actual demographic share.
\n\n
Claims that Kazakhization of public life drives Russians out—it's not that the Russians left a void.
\n\n
153 OVer-representation by titulars started under the Soviets, with implicit endorsement from Moscow
\n\n
\"What non-titular groups deplored as the 'over-representation' of the Kazakhs in the state strucutre, Kazakhs officials and ordinary people saw as a natural process and a right in their 'own' homeland.\"
\n\n
Survey data shows Kazakhs: perceive the state as an extension of the nation
\nsupport strong presidentialism
\nworry that nationalization hasn't gone far enough (officials still claim that Kazakhs are under-represented)
\nOnly 1 in three noticed a change in the ethnic makeup of their surroundings
\n\n
Whereas Russians: identify with the USSR or RF
\nworry that nationalization has gone too far
\n2 in 3 noticed more Kazakhs at work, in their neighborhood.
\n\n
154 There is no written policy of nationalization or affirmative action; it's informal but pervasive, and thus hard to measure.
\n\n
Dave's respondants citing what they percieved as nationalization: Kazakh supervisors making hiring and firing decisions; Kazakhs replacing Russians workers; non-Kazakh workers being made \"redundant;\" \"humiliation\" of not getting what they deserve driving Russians out of the workforce; Russian discomfort with being the only non-Kazakh in the area (white cow flight?)
\n\n
Of course, they also admit that patronage and bribery count for a lot too...
\n\n
155 \"[N]ationality is salient in all decisions on recruitment... Since nationality is always recorded in all identity documents, it becomes easy to attribute a greater salience to it than may be the case.\"
\n\n
156 Questions whether Kazakhs need an \"remedial\" policies, since there was already a well-established elite and middle class of urban, Russified Kazakhs who could (and did) take over government and economy.
\n\n
Kazakhs seem to perceive Russians and \"Jews\" as being more economically privileged than they are, even though Russians really don't have any special roles to play in trade with Russia that Kazakh can't also accomplish; now, (Israeli) Jews and Koreans, on the other hand...
\n\n
157 \"Kazakhstan's remedial nationalizing course has its genesis in the centralized, administrative command economy and the socialist ideology, which upheld collective claims over individual ones and saw individual liberties as rooted in the realization of socialist equality and guarantees of collective well-being.\"
\n\n
\"Real\" affirmitive action/social justice has to happen in a democracy, with a commitment to individual rights as well as collective justice.
\n\n
\"Nationalization [in KZ] has been limited to top-down, elite-led disbursement of rewards, status and positions. The middle strata of Kazakhs might have experienced some 'trickling down' of benefits as a result.... But there is no direct connection between nationalizing policies, institutional framework and economic well-being.\"
\n\n
157-8 As long as the administration keeps claiming a civic, multi-national state (and thus refusing to admit to an informal nationalization), it will never ACHIEVE such a state, because social justice isn't possible if you refuse to clearly see the problem.
\n\n
158 \"Kazakhs saw themselves as a 'small' or a maginalized nation, hospitable to a fault, which made them succumb to settler colonialism during the tsarist and Soviet period.\"
\n\n
Nationalization started out as \"defensive,\" to consolidate control over territory and resources (under Nan, naturally) and to foster ethnic cohesion between more and less Russified Kazakhs.
\n\n
159 Nazarbaev has spent lavishly on image (shiny Astana, PR campaigns) but underspent on social welfare and education.
\n\n
160 \"The Kazakhs might have become the symbolic owners of their own house, but they do not possess authorized channels of mobilizing their claims and participating in public debate on indigenousness, redistributive justice, culture or identity. The de facto status of the Kazakhs as the 'first among equal' within a multinational state is not adequately formalized in the Constitution o other legal documents. An abstract and symbolic emphasis by the state on ethno-cultural revival reflects a rhetorical commitment to the regeneration of (titular) national culture, rather than to notions of equity or justice. The elevated status of the Kazakh nationality and its cultural and linguistic symbols might offer a psychological insurance to the titular populace, but it does not provide a legal basis for providing ethnic redress to the less developed strata of the titular group.\"
\n\n
164-5 \"While elite action tends to be conceptualized as conscious and purposeful action, the arguments in this book have shown the extent to which it is embedded in the ideological and institutional framework erected under Soviet rule and draws sustenance from the discursive and cognitive categories of the Soviet system... The Soviet era 'survival' skills – neogitiating symbolic status and pursuing interest maximization...have proved to be critical in shaping the nature of elite competition in the post-Soviet context.\"
\n\n
165 Like the Soviets, Kazakhstan sees diversity primarily as a security problem. \"Within the existing Soviet-defined ideologicla frame, there is no way of reconceptualizing its 'nationalities' as social communities with their own history, patterns of self-organization and with an agency that pre-dates state authority. Nor is the state able to conceive of individuals first as citizens and only second as bearers of a particular ethno-national identity.\"
\n\n
166 Plenty of Kazakhs (esp. urban, Russified) didn't see the non-titulars as a bad thing; might negate the influences of the zhuzes and prevent ethnic nationalism. (Dave clearly likes these guys best).
\n\n
166-7 The state was stuck trying to affirm the primacy of Kazakhs without actually disrupting the status quo too much—so they have stuck to symbolic gestures without teeth.
\n\n
168 Kazakh cultureal revival is thus superficial; the lack of Kazakh-speaking intelligenstia is visible.
\n\n
168-9 Two strains of \"nationalism:\" instrumental nationalism of the political elites and everyday nationalism on the streets. The latter is pushed through a sort of beneign neglect of the state, but the fact that they're allowed to keep talking is a sure sign they're approved of.
\n\n
169-70 \"Overall, there are no authorized or organized channels for articulation of socio-economic and ethnic claims among the urbanizing marginal strata, the rural poor who are predominantly Kazakh-speakers who have not had the means or opportunities to obtain education in the more prestigious privatized universities. ...[T]he informal leaders of spokespersons evoke the symbolism of clan, of Islam, of traditional Kazakh values as they employ the language of social equity and empowerment to organize the poor and the marginalized.\"
\n\n
Edward Schatz, 2000. \"The politics of multiple identities: lineage and ethnicity in Kazakhstan.\" Europe-Asia Studies 52(3) pp 489-506.
\n\n
170: \"The regime's fixation with 'stability' and 'preservation of ethnic harmony' has impeded the development of civic and participatory institutions, despite the creation of favourable economic conditions for a political transition.\" Is this really the biggest problem, honey?
\n\n
Democracy emerges out of debate (not the other way around!)
\n\n
171: \"The absence of a regime change in Kazakhstan...is not a mere setback to establishing democratic institutions and practices: It has also meant a fundamental failure to assess the more immediate Soviet past and to make a conscious break from the coercive and paternalistic regulation of society by the state.\"
\n\n
\"The absense of conflict over the language issue is paradoxically linked to the failure of the ruling elites to develop a shared national idea and to rally the support of the society in cultural and identity construction and nation-building...
\n\"A successful postcolonial nationalist project rests on 'superseding the conditions of colonial rule' … a decolonization of the national imagination.\"
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"2013-06-29T18:09:15Z", "PMID": "", "PMCID": "", "ISSN": "", "archive": "", "archiveLocation": "", "shortTitle": "Language and Sovereignty", "language": "", "libraryCatalog": "Google Scholar", "callNumber": "", "rights": "", "extra": "", "tags": [ { "tag": "Kazakhstan" } ], "collections": [], "relations": {}, "dateAdded": "2013-06-29T18:10:04Z", "dateModified": "2013-06-29T18:10:04Z" } }, { "key": "DGD9QS9B", "version": 1, "library": { "type": "group", "id": 88071, "name": "Central Eurasian Linguistics", "links": { "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/groups/central_eurasian_linguistics", "type": "text/html" } } }, "links": { "self": { "href": "https://api.zotero.org/groups/88071/items/DGD9QS9B", "type": "application/json" }, "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/groups/central_eurasian_linguistics/items/DGD9QS9B", "type": "text/html" }, "up": { "href": "https://api.zotero.org/groups/88071/items/CBVMEF8R", "type": "application/json" } }, "meta": { "createdByUser": { "id": 1094625, "username": "kennedyme", "name": "", "links": { "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/kennedyme", "type": "text/html" } } }, "numChildren": 0 }, "data": { "key": "DGD9QS9B", "version": 1, "parentItem": "CBVMEF8R", "itemType": "note", "note": "Argues that tribalism \"constitutes a political and legal counter-culture\"
\nCounts the nomad as the first agents of globalization, moving between two great empires (Russia and China--I guess the Ottomans don't count?) cf. Mufwene and Vigoroux's generous definition of colonialism.
\nDerides historiographers for making shit up; says that the work of historians to \"restore\" the past must be kept separate from politics, since there is no continuity between ancient Central Asian states (his example -- Kokand khanate) and the present day. However, there is no point in \"appropriating\" ideas of statehood from \"foreign histories\" either.
\nIs oddly pro-soviet...
\nDescribes the establishment of the Central Asian SSRs as having \"a certain futurological administrative-political form...The communists not only created republics with their own governments, borders, flags, seals, and all other attributes, but even gave these republics, in the end, real independence.\"
\nCA didn't even want its independence! They weren't fighting to be free--they were practically kicked out.
\nRefers to \"Suddenly Acquitision of Independence Syndrome\"--the new leaders didn't know what to with themselves.
\nAll of CA is laboring under the \"inertia of Sovietness\"; Turkmenistan is Stalinism, Kyrgyzstan is Brezhnevism
\n\"Все, что происходит в странах региона, включая вопросы государствообразования, нельзя рассматривать как движение в сторону развития и приближение к международным стандартам...но, в большей степени, это - перерождение советского на инерционной основе, то есть так называемый посткоммунизм на постсоветском пространстве.\"
All that happens in the countries of the region, including questions of state formation, must not be looked at as movement towards development and international standards... but, to a great degree, it is a rebirth of the Soviet on an inertial basis, which is the so-called post-communism of the post-soviet sphere.
Argues that a some kind of national Idea is necessary to help statehood coalesce; claims Kazakhstan's Big Idea is Kazakhstan 2030 and the general desire to play with the big boys. (At least they have a Big Idea; Kyrgyzstan allegedly doesn't.)
\n\n
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The main thing: only in 2004 did independent Kazakhstan get a positive net migration. In 1994 alone 477,000 people left the country; almost three million total left in the first ten years, compared to less than one million 2001-2009.
\nI cannot figure out the \"language of instruction\" numbers on page 21 for 1991-2000.
\nStarting 2000 it's clear the umber of students in Russian-medium education is falling off sharply, # in Kazakh-medium seems steady.
\nNumber of college has grown sharply in the 21C; share of ethnic kazakh students from 64% in 2000/1 to 72% in 2007/8.
\nNumber of VUZes also growing; Kazakhs outnumbers Russians 3-1 in 2000/1, now 4-1 in 2009/10.
\np41 AVERAGE INCOMES!
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\nHowever, ethnic shares are nearly equal in population over sixty--40% Kazakh, 42% Russian
", "tags": [], "relations": {}, "dateAdded": "2012-09-11T04:55:44Z", "dateModified": "2012-09-11T04:55:44Z" } }, { "key": "TPSNS556", "version": 1, "library": { "type": "group", "id": 88071, "name": "Central Eurasian Linguistics", "links": { "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/groups/central_eurasian_linguistics", "type": "text/html" } } }, "links": { "self": { "href": "https://api.zotero.org/groups/88071/items/TPSNS556", "type": "application/json" }, "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/groups/central_eurasian_linguistics/items/TPSNS556", "type": "text/html" }, "up": { "href": "https://api.zotero.org/groups/88071/items/KHIQFTQH", "type": "application/json" } }, "meta": { "createdByUser": { "id": 1094625, "username": "kennedyme", "name": "", "links": { "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/kennedyme", "type": "text/html" } } }, "numChildren": 0 }, "data": { "key": "TPSNS556", "version": 1, "parentItem": "KHIQFTQH", "itemType": "note", "note": "Lack of infrastructure to support Kazakh in 1989: only one Kazakh-medium elementary school in the whole county, no textbooks, few qualified teachers.
\nClaims Russian as \"official\" language \"fulfills fewer sociolinguistic functions overall, and fewer functions of high prestige and official visibility,\" contra Dave's claim that Kazakh is a symbolic garnish.
\nYounger respondants were more likely to respond that they would raise their children in Kazakh; women more likely to choose not-Kazakh
\nCompares to Gal etc, that women may want the upward mobility of urbanity/Russian
", "tags": [], "relations": {}, "dateAdded": "2012-09-11T04:55:44Z", "dateModified": "2012-09-11T04:55:44Z" } }, { "key": "GXTVRKCI", "version": 1, "library": { "type": "group", "id": 88071, "name": "Central Eurasian Linguistics", "links": { "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/groups/central_eurasian_linguistics", "type": "text/html" } } }, "links": { "self": { "href": "https://api.zotero.org/groups/88071/items/GXTVRKCI", "type": "application/json" }, "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/groups/central_eurasian_linguistics/items/GXTVRKCI", "type": "text/html" }, "up": { "href": "https://api.zotero.org/groups/88071/items/9AXKZZER", "type": "application/json" } }, "meta": { "createdByUser": { "id": 1094625, "username": "kennedyme", "name": "", "links": { "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/kennedyme", "type": "text/html" } } }, "numChildren": 0 }, "data": { "key": "GXTVRKCI", "version": 1, "parentItem": "9AXKZZER", "itemType": "note", "note": "The intelligensia of KZ are among its most russified, thanks to Soviet-era education policies
\n\"Its is therefore not uncommon for a Kazak intellectual to have a grandfather who was an illiterate nomad.\" -- most of the urban, russified Kazakhs are just a generation or two away from the steppe themselves.
\nKazakhstan for Kazakhs; the rest of you, y'all got your own homelands.
\nThe invention/\"rediscovery\" of a Kazakh history and culture was the task of the intelligensia; learning to celebrate Nauryz out of books, for instance.
\n\"The Kazak scholars became cultural mediators and interpreters because they were he only ones who could give the new natinoal state a scientific stamp of approval.\"
\nCompetition within the intelligensia to be Kazakhier-than-thou; upended traditional networks and hierarchies.
\nEconomic crisis of the 90s drove many scholars out of academia unless they could secure the right patronage by doing the \"right\" research.
\nPersonal opinion of a scholar: Kazakh is a lovely, emotional language, but Russian is more scientific and precise
\nEthnic Russian scholars can't get a break at all, natch.
\nToday's intelligensia want their kids to go into business in order to achieve economic prosperity.
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\nCentral Asian states are \"awkward\" in the sense that a lot of things get done outside the traditional mechanics and institutions associated with statehood--ie patronage networks instead of bureaucracy. But they're still functional states!
", "tags": [], "relations": {}, "dateAdded": "2012-09-11T04:55:44Z", "dateModified": "2012-09-11T04:55:44Z" } }, { "key": "BE2SXTTQ", "version": 1, "library": { "type": "group", "id": 88071, "name": "Central Eurasian Linguistics", "links": { "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/groups/central_eurasian_linguistics", "type": "text/html" } } }, "links": { "self": { "href": "https://api.zotero.org/groups/88071/items/BE2SXTTQ", "type": "application/json" }, "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/groups/central_eurasian_linguistics/items/BE2SXTTQ", "type": "text/html" }, "up": { "href": "https://api.zotero.org/groups/88071/items/K9VZQV6D", "type": "application/json" } }, "meta": { "createdByUser": { "id": 1094625, "username": "kennedyme", "name": "", "links": { "alternate": { "href": "https://www.zotero.org/kennedyme", "type": "text/html" } } }, "numChildren": 0 }, "data": { "key": "BE2SXTTQ", "version": 1, "parentItem": "K9VZQV6D", "itemType": "note", "note": "p1-2 Political systems of Central Asian republics still look substantially similar to Soviet era; no rejection of Soviet institutions apparent (since they weren't interested in leaving the USSR in the first place!!!)17erceptions of elites is what will motivate institutional change
\n15: \"The greater, or more disruptive,they [elites] perceive this [external] shock to be, the more institutional change we can expect because established elites will find less utility in clinging to their previous political identities.\"
\n17: \"In contrast, I arge that stability was possible in Kazakhstan...precisely because, during the transition [from communism], elites embraced the very political identity they adopted under Soviet rule -- regionalism.\"
\n18: Compares CA to Africa in that \"sustained mass mobilization and popular protest\" are/were necessary to bring about democracy--well, we'll see (Tulip Revolution?)
\n51: Western political scholars predicted interethnic violence, radical Islamization, tribalism (whatever we're meaning by that lately), and general chaos; that didn't happen, obvs, at least not right away.
\n52: \"In short Soviet policies and institutions in Central Asia created, transformed and institutionalized regional political identities, while at the same time eliminating tribal, religious, and national identities, weakening them, or confining them to the social and cultural spheres.\"
\n53: Identities in her work are \"conscious investments that individuals make in response to these structural incentives\"--namely, the institutions at work that may benefit some identities more than others.
\n60-62: Too many scholars imposed their outsider perceptions, assuming that religion/ethnic/whatever distinctions were as salient locally as they were from a distance and that these distinctions would automatically form the basis of a new identity politics.
\n63: Both elites and the masses invested in regional identities in order to obtain power and resources, respectively.
\n64-65: Argues that Soviet demarcation couldn't really invent ethnicities; rather, it ended up reinforcing \"local\" identities and political identity at the oblast level, rather than the republic level.
\n67-68: Central Asia was so agriculture-heavy that that they lacked the economic basis for separatism (she claims).
\n68: \"ethnic division of labor\" with Slavs doing the management/skilled labor and Kazakhs doing the grunt work--but Dave would say this was a result of demographics and was already shifting by the 1970s (at least in Kaz).
\n69-71: cites ongoing remnants of korenizatsia for why titulars were systematically promoted into political power (even if only as figureheads).
\n72-3: Islam depoliticized: Arabic script replaced, holidays co-opted, \"red mullahs,\" official atheism. Islam survived only on a local basis and thus was useless as a national organizing principle.
\n73-4: Oblast heads competed against one another at the republic level for resources, and against the agenda/priorities of the republican administration.
\n91: \"The fact that Soviets clearly viewed Kazakhstan as a half-Kazakh, half-Russian republic almost from the beginning in and of itself fostered national divisions.\" Specific oblasts were Russian, specific were Kazakh.
\n93: Soviets tried to attend to and co-opt clan identities, for instance, in creating kolkhozes; this created the hybridity and \"tribalism\" that allegedly plagued the region, as old clan structures became intertwined with the Soviet administration system.
\n96: Division of labor was regional and ethnic: Russians happened to be pluralities or majorities in the most industrialized oblasts (northern, eastern), Kazakhs--south and west, where agriculture and oil/gas extraction dominated. (Kazakh hydrocarbons weren't refined in the KSSR, they were piped to RSFR).
\nKorenizatsia here also meant \"promoting\" non-Kazakhs, since there were so few who were capable and ideologically correct enough to take on administrative posts; politically, Russians were disproportionate for the first few decades.
\n98: My question is, why should a combination of regionalism and nationalism create MORE stability after independence?
\n100: Her answer: regionalism means everyone's invested in maintaining as much of the status quo as possible, in order to hold together regional patronage networks. As long as everyone keeps playing by the old rules, everyone's happy.
\n137 \"Moreover, the nature of the transition in Kazakhstan reinforced regional rather than national cleavages, while at the same time enabling divisions between the titular and nontitular nationalities (primarily Kazakhs and Russians) to persist and indeed flourish.\"
\n145: Quotes a deputy akim: \"Nazarbaev has more to fear from the regions than he does the national question.... There are only two nationalities in Kazakhstan, but many regions.\"
\n152: \"...during the first few years of independence Nazarbaev encouraged the conceptualization of Kazakhsta as a multiethnic, secular state rather than one that represents a particular nationality.\" -- he was \"Striking a balance\" between the Kazakhs and Russians
\n153: \"leaders from both Kazakh and Russian nationalist organizations were repeatedly subject to arrest.\"
\n155: Nazarbaev gave enormous autonomy to regional akims, as allies against a recalcitrant legislature, and the akims ran with it.
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\n\"Party ideologists at least implied that the culture of the most numerous ethnic group comprising the Soviet people -- the Russians -- was the dominant element in the common culture, and that the mutual enrichment involved more 'giving' by Russians and more 'borrowing' by all others.\"
\nThe Soviet sense of identity or groupness \"were rooted largely in Russian culture and language, and mediated by ethnic Russians.\"
\nKaz, other states now face \"the challenge of effacing other senses of groupness\" that might lead to social instability (is Islamism, Russian nationalism--but not Kazakh nationalism, because it's rastsvet!)
\nThis article focuses on Kazakh groupness -- where are the works on non-Kazakh attitudes towards Soviet hegemony?
\nNazarbaev seems to recapitulate rastsvet/sliyanie, though he uses different vocabulary--natsiya/ult rather than narod/xalyq (does the former seem to imply a forced assimilation? Or are we playing faster and looser with the definition of natsiya now that the USSR is over?)
\nFierman notes one reaction in the Kazakh-language press (see Tussupova) that Kazakhs are too \"weak\"/Russified as an ethnos to be a state-defining people, and will just end up more Russified if they have to play host to outsiders.
\n\"For this reason, a longstanding question in defining the content of Kazakh culture has revolved around the problem of determining....which certain borrowed elements of Russian culture have become integral parts of Kazakh culture that should be embraced, or, alternatively, classified as alien and therefore purged.\"
\nPredicts that Kazakh is going to expand.
\nNotes the tight link between territory, language and ethnichood.
\nHistorians trace Kazakh statehood back to ancient times, and it just happens to coincidentally correspond exactly with Kazakhstan's current borders.
\nNotes that Soviet ideologists never claimed that Russian was the main language of all citizens--\"second mother tongue\" was as close as they got.
\n\"A corollary of this view [of ethnic statehood] is a belief that, in independent Kazakhstan, members of the titular nationality have a right or even obligation to promote their language as an element of groupness, especially among their co-ethnics.\"
\nNotes that literacy != lack of literary tradition; nomads can't carry books, so Kazakh oral tradition was everything.
\nPoints out that shift to Latin alphabet made a break with pre-Soviet writings in Arabic, and Cyrillicization made a break with Turkey and Europe, fostering closer ties (dependency?) to Russia.
\nCites MiniEd data: even in the 1980s, a sizeable majority of rural students were in Kazakh-medium instruction still.
\nAlso ascribes Late Soviet population growth to high birthrates.
\nNotes low percentages of Kazakhs in certain oblasts and cities.
\n\"Thus, the need for raising the level of Kazakh skills was, above all, an urban problem.\"
\nCurrent generation of urban Kazakhs seems more interested in supporting Kazakh, including for \"affective reasons\" (ie because they want to be more Kazakh) not just instrumental/economic ones.
\nGrowth in Kazakh-language radio and television--\"...a substantial share of the Kazakh audience, including the urban audience, tunes in to Kazakh-language electronic media.\"
\nOfficial shift to using Kazakh in government offices is underway--\"it is clear that Kazakh is used much more in government offices today than fifteen years ago, let alone in the Brezhnev era of the 1970s and early 1980s.\"
\nUrban Kazakhs probably were part of a Soviet narod; \"Changes in the mass media, education and workplace since independence have probably not fundamentally changed the cleavages that underlie groupness in Kazakhstan. However, thanks in part to the greater prevalence of the Kazakh language in various domains since independence, the language appears to have begun to serve as part of a commonality for an increasing share of Kazakhs.\"
\nLinks appointment of Nazarbaev to the \"informals,\" proto-advocacy groups with cultural or environmentalist agendas.
\n\"He [Nazarbaev] has stressed that the teaching of Kazakh should focus on the next generation rather than today's mature adults, and that before Kazakhs demand members of other ethnic groups to learn the Kazakh language, Kazakhs themselves should learn and use it.\" Also warned repeatedly of the risks of tryingto shift too quickly.
\nNazarbaev's insistance on a strong center and little regional autonomy, which has to do with fears of secession, means that Kazak-language measures are in force even in places that still have a plurality of Russians.
\nThe offices responsible for enforcing language policy have not been stable or consistent over time; Nazarbaev keeps shuffling things around.
\nWidespread corruption also makes it hard to enforce testing requirements
\nDependence on Russian moderates all forms of Kazakh nationalism, since any insult to ethnic Slavs could have Russia crying foul.
\nEconomic barriers to Kazakification: you need cash to hire/train your workers, print textbooks, produce a TV show, whatever.
\nDue to economic collapse, \"few people have the luxury of spare time to engage in language courses for which there is no immediate economic payoff\"--they're all working two jobs.
\nRussian schools remain the best job prospects, and most families can't afford private language tutors, private Kazakh-medium schools, etc. that would balance Kazakh acquisition.
\nGrowing Kazakh share of the population, including the influx of Kazakh-speaking oralman, is a huge factor.
\nIncreasing number of Kazakh-speaking urbanites is raising the visibility of Kazakh, ie bilingual advertisements and token amounts of Kazakh in public spaces (ie workplace).
\nClaims that the ideology of Kazakh hegemony has \"at least grudging support\" from a majority of the people, including non-Kazakhs.
\n\"In areas ranging from advanced science to popular entertainment, Russian seems likely to continue to hold a substantial niche, though in these and other domains the functions once served exclusively or very heavily by Russian are already being shared with other [languages], more importantly English.
\nPredicts good prospects for the future of Kazakh among Kazakhs, reticent to predict is future among non-Kazakhs.
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\n\"Even if some remnants of the old [Soviet] system remain, the CPSU no longer has the monopoly on power, a guiding ideology no longer exists, there is little, if any, routine mobilization of the population within state-sponsored organizations to achieve a minimum degree of compliance, and leadership recruitment is no longer restricted to the official party.\"
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