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            "title": "Strategic Inputs into Patent Pools",
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                    "firstName": "Justus",
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            "abstractNote": "This article explores what factors determine the introduction of patents into a patent pool. We propose a dynamic analysis of 1337 U.S. patent inputs into 7 important pools. This analysis highlights a trade-off between firm and patent characteristics as the determinants of inclusion of patents into pools. For instance we prove that firms already member of the pool are able to include lower quality patents. These findings can be explained both by bargaining power and information asymmetry. In particular, as measured by a new indicator, insiders and firms practicing the technology file patents that are better aligned with the criteria of essentiality.",
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            "title": "Patent pools and dynamic R&D incentives",
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                    "firstName": "Vianney",
                    "lastName": "Dequiedt"
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                {
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                    "firstName": "Bruno",
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            "abstractNote": "Patent pools are cooperative agreements between two or more firms to license their related patents as a bundle. In a continuous-time model of multistage innovations, we characterize firms’ incentives to perform R&D when they anticipate the possibility of starting a pool of complementary patents, which can be essential or nonessential. A coalition formation protocol leads the first innovators to start the pool immediately after they patent the essential technologies. The firms invest more than in the no-pool case and increase the speed of R&D for essential technologies as the number of patents progresses to the anticipated endogenous pool size, to the benefit of consumers. There is overinvestment in R&D compared to a joint profit-maximization benchmark. If firms anticipate the addition of nonessential patents to the pool they reduce their R&D efforts for the essential patents at each point in time, resulting in a slower time to market for the pooled technologies.",
            "publicationTitle": "International Review of Law and Economics",
            "publisher": "",
            "place": "",
            "date": "October 2013",
            "volume": "36",
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            "pages": "59-69",
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            "journalAbbreviation": "International Review of Law and Economics",
            "DOI": "10.1016/j.irle.2013.04.009",
            "citationKey": "",
            "url": "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818813000355",
            "accessDate": "2014-06-02T14:14:54Z",
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