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"note": "Ref.ª | Binet, M. (2026, março). Entrevistas de aconselhamento e de acompanhamento em socio-economia familiar em França : Co-análise conversacional e explicitante das práticas e dos saberes profissionais—Projeto de Tese. Doutoramento em Serviço Social. Unidade Curricular « Seminário de Projeto de Tese » (docente : Júlia Cardoso, Doutora em Serviço Social), Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Serviço Social de Lisboa da Universidade Lusíada (ISSSL-UL).
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Nota : 19/20
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Ref.ª | Binet, M. (2026, março). Ler Jeremy Kearney : A co-investigação prática em Serviço Social à luz do socioconstrucionismo wittgensteiniano e da etnometodologia. Doutoramento em Serviço Social. Unidade Curricular « Seminário avançado em Intervenção em Serviço Social » (docente : Isabel de Sousa, Doutora em Serviço Social), Lisboa: Instituto Superior de Serviço Social de Lisboa da Universidade Lusíada (ISSSL-UL).
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Nota : 19/20
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«(…) there exists, in general, no pristine range of experiences open to us, comes directly, as we have seen, from the work of Sapir, Whorf and Lévi-Strauss.
We thus invent the world we inhabit: we modify and reconstruct what is given» (Hawkes, 1977: 106-107).
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Hawkes, T. (1977). Structuralism and Semiotics. University of California Press.
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«(…) ethnomethodology's approach to practical action and practical reasoning is (…) in line with the Aristotelian concept of \"phronesis\"» (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 15).
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«Ethnomethodology is an approach to the study of practical action and practical reasoning (…)» (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 262).
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«As the term ethnomethodology suggests, it is an approach to the study of the \"folk methods\" through which social actions are produced and made intelligible. (…) Commonly a distinction between \"folk\" (or \"lay\") procedures and professional (or \"scientific\") procedures places professional in a superior epistemic position, but Garfinkel took the distinction in a different direction. While acknowledging that folk methods may be local and ad hoc, he viewed them as stable features of social settings where, for better or worse, practical judgments are made, actions taken, and their consequences realized. In addition, though they may have no privileged claim to establishing transcendental truths, folk methods will often serve as practically adequate for discerning and establishing \"the truth ofthe matter\" in situ» (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 262-263).
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«(…) [Garfinkel] recommended that sociologists should suspend their professional concerns with methodology, while seeking to investigate the ethnomethodologies used in countless other settings of conduct. Even though ordinary methods may seem to be loose, biased, or otherwise faulty ways of conducting inquiries, they are substantively part of the way routine social scenes are assembled. (…) To say that their methods are unscientific does not address their constitutive relationship to the social settings in which they take place. Garfinkel was not suggesting that commonsense methods are generally adequate for social-scientific purposes, or that we have no right to criticize particular instances of them; rather, he was recommending that we investigate the constitutive relationship between commonsense methods and the stable social phenomena they produce and implicate» (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 263).
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«The epistemic stance taken by ethnomethodologists is neither normative nor denunciatory. Unlike many social-science inquirers, ethnomethodologists do not draw an ironic contrast between folk and scientific methods of inquiry. They do not view folk methods as degraded, partial, or ideologically biased versions of scientific methods» (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 264).
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«Aside from the methodological difficulties involved in following through on the policy of indifference, social-science audiences commonly express disappointment with \"mere descriptions\" that do not explain the case under study through reference to the underlying or contextual structures of power and meaning specified by selected social, cultural, literary, and political theories. Related disappointments pertain to the general absence of a normative stance in ethnomethodological studies» (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 264).
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«This field [of language use and practical action] is composed of intelligible actions performed on singular occasions» (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 265).
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«(…) what interests us most is how the instantiation of such cultural resources [binary oppositions, linguistic categories, procedural rules and protocols, references to cherished constitutional rights and ethical values, invocations of national interest, and popular media themes] took place as part of a dialogical production. Consequently, we intend to describe the singular, interactional encoding and resistance to encoding, performed at the surface of a media text by a witness and his interrogators» (Lynch & Bogen, 1996: 266).
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p.270 | Wittgenstein : descriptions of singular activities
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p.285 | protoethical rights and obligations to speak and listen
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LYNCH, Michael; BOGEN, David - The Spectacle of History : Speech, Text, and Memory at the Iran-contra Hearings. Durham / London : Duke University Press, 1996
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«The heart of any discipline sustained by discovery is its practice» (Livingston, 1987: ix).
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p.23 | elaborate the description in terms of the actual lived-details of the organizational work of pedestrian street crossings
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Livingston, E. (1987) Making Sense of Ethnomethodology. London / New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
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«Re-watching the recording leads to an engagement with empirical materials that is close to knowing a poem by heart or a stage actor learning their lines. By this repetition, we are departing from the involvement of the participants in the original setting, even as the purpose is to become deeply intimate with what they were doing and how they achieved it. It is in this departure that ethnomethodology pursues it investigations, and that is part of its peculiar work. It is a departure that constantly returns us to the very scene through concentrating upon what we otherwise usually leave behind when studying it by interview, statistical summary or theoretical illustration» (Laurier, 2014 (draft): 7).
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Laurier, E. (2014). Noticing. In R. Lee, N. Castree, R. Kitchin, V. Lawson, A. Paasi, C. Philo, S. Radcliffe, S. M. Roberts, & C. W. J. Withers (Éds.), The SAGE Handbook of Human Geography (Vol. 1) (Vols. 1‑2, p. 250‑272). SAGE Publications.
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«At this point, then, we find ourselves provisionally treating the candidate Troubles-Telling Sequence as a \"template\" for the production of any given interaction in wich \"troubles\" are talked about (...)» (Jefferson & Lee, 1981: 401).
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p.410: Service-Seeker - Service-Supplier / Advice-Seeker - Advice-Giver
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Jefferson, G., & Lee, J. R. E. (1981). The rejection of advice : Managing the problematic convergence of a « troubles-telling » and a « service encounter ». Journal of Pragmatics, 5, 399‑422.
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«The recurrently found rejection of advice in talk about a trouble may (...) be accomplice to an attempt by a troubles teller to preserve the status of the talk as a troubles telling, with its particular structural and interactional properties, and to maintain incumbency in the category troubles teller, with its particular and general perquisites» (Jefferson & Lee, 1992: 535).
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«What emerges from such materials (...) may be characterized as the advice giver's \"essential interest\" in the problem and its properties, and \"essential indifference\" to the troubles teller and his or her experiences» (Jefferson & Lee, 1992: 537).
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Jefferson, G., & Lee, J. R. E. (1992). The rejection of advice : Managing the problematic convergence of a « troubles-telling » and a « service encounter ». In P. Drew & J. Heritage (Éds.), Talk at Work : Interaction in Institutional Settings (p. 521‑548). Cambridge University Press.
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«(...) the term \"language-game\" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life» (Wittgenstein, 1958: 23).
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«One learns the game by watching how others play. But we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the practice of the game — like a natural law governing the play. —— But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players' mistakes and correct play? — There are characteristic signs of it in the players' behaviour. Think of the behaviour characteristic of correcting a slip of the tongue. It would be possible to recognize that someone was doing so even without knowing his language» (Wittgenstein, 1958: #54).
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«(...) the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres» (Wittgenstein, 1958: 67).
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«The question \"What is a word really?\" is analogous to \"What is a piece in chess?\"» (Wittgenstein, 1958: 108).
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«When philosophers use a word — \"knowledge\", \"being\", \"object\", \"I\", \"proposition\", \"name\" — and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? —
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use» (Wittgenstein, 1958: #116).
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«(…) for us it is the circumstances under which he had such an experience that justify him in saying in such a case that he understands, that he knows how to go on» (Wittgenstein, 1958: #155).
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p.194 | the duck-rabbit figure
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«(...) a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom» (Wittgenstein, 1958: #198).
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«To understand a sentence means to understand a language» (Wittgenstein, 1958: #199).
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«The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language» (Wittgenstein, 1958: #206).
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«What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes» (Wittgenstein, 1958: #415).
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«Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through \"'experience'.—Can someone else be a man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right tip.—This is what 'learning' and 'teaching' are like here.— What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only ex perienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating-rules.
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What is most difficult here is to put this indefiniteness, correctly and unfalsified, into words» (Wittgenstein, 1958, II, xi: 227* ; emphases in original).
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Wittgenstein, L. (1958) Philosophical Investigations (1953). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
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«It is a commonplace of conversation analysis that (…) much of what is said is only sensible against a background of silently agreed knowledge» (Antaki, 1988: 12).
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Antaki, C., 1988. Explanations, communication and social cognition. In C. Antaki, ed. Analysing Everyday Explanation: A Casebook of Methods. London: Sage, pp. 1–14.
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